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Abstract:  
The analysis of trade policy shows growing interest in various types of “standards”. While 
technical regulations and standards are introduced to protect the interest of consumers, they 
can also act as technical barriers to trade (TBT), as foreign suppliers complying with national 
regulations might be required to bear certain costs of adjustment to the new regime.  
 
Recent literature focused on the concept of standards and concluded that shared standards 
promote trade. We instead set our attention to technical regulations of the European Union 
and concentrate on their effects on trade costs. The analysis is inspired by Gandal and Shy’s 
(2001) cost reducing standardization union theory. 
 
This paper summarizes results of research undertaken within a larger product assessing 
importance of technical barriers to trade for new EU members. The recent empirical study by 
Hagemejer (2005), based on detailed trade data of the EU. He has shown that in sectors where 
the EU technical regulations are most complicated and require costly adaptation, the trade 
within EU is booming. He argues that the trade between EU members is more concentrated 
within the high-TBT products, while the imports from outside are focused on the low-TBT or 
no-TBT products. Thus, EU technical regulations might in fact be trade diverting if the 
difference in productivity between intra and extra-EU partners is large. 
In this context we analyze the pattern of new members’ exports to the “old” EU. We calculate 
the trade coverage of various standardisation approaches and analyze the comparative 
advantage structure of the new EU members. We demonstrate that the structure of TBT’s 
affecting exports from new EU members is slowly converging with the one that characterizes 
intra-EU trade. Therefore, we expect that CEEC’s countries will benefit from applying 
common technical regulations of the EU after accession. In the last section of our paper we 
report the results of questionnaire-based research made among Polish companies in December 
of 2004, i.e. after the Eastern enlargement. It seems that the adjustment costs were moderate 
and the adaptation process to new technical regulations is already completed. Therefore, one 
can expected welfare gains for new members of the EU. We perform a CGE simulation using 
a GTAP model to assess these gains.  
 
 
Elements of standardization union theory 
A well known theoretical model aiming at analyzing the effects of common standardization 
policy has been elaborated by Gandal and Shy (2001).2 The authors develop the basic three-
country, three-firm, and three horizontally differentiated goods model. For the sake of 
                                               
1 The background research for this paper was co-financed by the Polish State Committee for Scientific Research 
and FEMISE network, financed by the European Commission. We used background materials and some 
conclusions from FEM 22-03 (2005) report.  
2 The authors do not distinguish between compulsory technical regulations and non-compulsory standards. They 
describe standards as they were compulsory. So in fact we should talk about technical regulations’ union. 
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simplicity they assume that all varieties are produced with the same unit cost (equal to zero). 
But producers have to face the unit conversion (compliance) cost of a new compulsory 
standard (technical regulation). The utility of an arbitrary consumer, based on Salop approach, 
depends mainly on price and on index measuring how close a given variety to the ideal model 
is. The consumers can benefit from network effects, while producers do not.3  
In the model the difference between these two effects is important. In the case of conversion 
costs, nonrecognition increases the market share and profits of the domestic firm and reduces 
the market share and profits of the foreign firms relative to the case in which foreign 
standards are recognized. In the network effects case, nonrecognition of foreign standards has 
no effect on prices, market shares, or profits, but has impact on consumers’ utility. 
In this framework Gandal and Shy analyze the efficiency of governmental policy. When 
government policy is limited to either recognizing all foreign standards or not recognizing any 
foreign standard, recognition is always the outcome.  
Initially, authors examine two extreme cases: in the first one, they assume that there are no 
network effects and conversion costs are high. In this setting, when governments do not 
recognize foreign standards, foreign firms must incur a compliance cost in order be permitted 
to sell in the domestic country. In the second case, they assume the network effects are large 
while conversion costs are non-existent (or negligible). 
On this basis Gandal and Shy analyze prerequisites of creating the standardization union.  
They prove that in the case in which there are no network effects, it is profitable for two of the 
countries to form a union, when the conversion costs are moderate or large. The formation of 
a standardization union will cause some consumers in member countries to switch from the 
third country’s good to a brand produced by a member country. Thus, a formation of the 
union will increase trade between member countries, whereas trade between members and the 
nonmember will decrease. Therefore, in classic terminology, the formation of a 
standardization union will cause trade diversion, and therefore will reduce aggregate world 
welfare, since with the absence of a union, countries will choose to mutually recognize all 
standards. 
In the reverse case in which there are positive network effects, and no conversion costs, all 
countries mutually recognize all (obligatory) standards and have no incentives to form 
                                               
3 The latter assumption is not very realistic, because producers may also benefit from information value provided 
by standard or from economies of scale.  
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standardization unions. In the more realistic setting in which there are both conversion costs 
and network effects, the profitability of a standardization union will depend on the relative 
magnitudes of the two effects. The work of Gandal and Shy suggests that strong network 
effects will reduce the likelihood of standardization unions which divert trade and reduce 
world welfare. 
The last conclusion is qualified. They point out that standardization unions are not always 
welfare reducing. In an earlier version of the presented paper, they showed that when 
standardization conversion costs are extremely large, the nonrecognition of foreign brands 
eliminates foreign products from domestic market. In this case a formation of the union will 
create new trade between the union countries.4 Thus in some instances, a formation of a 
standardization union may increase world welfare.  
Thus, we may conclude that work of Gandal and Shy has important theoretical implications 
for explaining effects of the standardization policy of the European Union. It may also be 
useful in better understanding the economic position of exporters from new member states.  
First, it provides an explanation why uniform technical regulations applied by the EU may 
provoke trade diversion and restrict imports from third countries. Second, it explains why 
protective effect may be more powerful in some sectors (like food industry) in which the 
compliance costs are relatively high, whereas network effects are probably close to zero. On 
the other hand the restrictive effect of technical regulations in sectors exhibiting substantial 
network effects (like household electronics or electric equipment) might not exist or be only 
very limited.  Third, it provides explanation why CEEC countries, having previously quite 
distinct system of technical regulations, limiting the foreign competition, might benefit from 
the accession to the EU. It could be interpreted as a case for trade creation in the 
standardization union. In our paper we will try to empirically verify some of these hypotheses. 
 
Approaches to the harmonization policy in the EU 
Common standardization policy leads to establishment of common technical regulations 
and standards. The European Union defines technical barrier to trade as a situation when a 
producer from one Member State who wants to sell his/her product in another Member State 
must meet different technical regulations (or standards). A situation when a product needs 
                                               
4 The concept of trade creation and diversion is used here in a traditional Vinerian terminology. 
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additional testing or certification procedure before it is allowed to be marketed in another 
country is also considered a technical barrier to trade (TBT)5. 
The approach of the European Union to the removal of TBT is twofold. It bases either on (i) 
Mutual Recognition (MR) Principle or on (ii) Harmonization. The MR Principle states that 
any product legally manufactured and marketed in one country of the EU must be allowed 
free entry in any other market of the EU. The Harmonization approach applies when the MR 
Principle fails to work. It is based on the unification of standards and regulations among the 
Member States. 
Harmonization of standards is needed when the MRP fails to remove technical barriers to 
trade, i.e. when the Member States do not want to recognize each other standards and 
regulations. The evolution of harmonized regulations is quite impressive. In 1975 there were 
20 EU-wide (i.e. common for all states) regulations. In 1999 – almost 5.5 thousand. In 
principle, harmonization relies on the superiority of the EU law over national law. There are 
two approaches to harmonization in the European Union. The traditional, Old Approach and 
the more recent, New Approach. Both will be discussed below. 
The traditional approach of the EU to harmonization is often called the Old Approach (OA). 
It gives a very detailed instruction on the characteristics of a product as well as on the process 
of production. Most of the Old Approach directives apply only to narrow product groups and 
to specific health, environmental and safety characteristics.  
One problem with the OA is that it is time consuming. It is very difficult for all members 
states to reach a compromise on the final shape of the legislation. In order to reach a common 
set of standards, some (usually all) countries must change their legislations. This can be costly 
for the firms from those countries. Therefore each country would like to have common 
standards as similar as possible to their own standards in order to minimize adjustment costs 
for their domestic firms. At the moment the OA directives are applied mostly in sectors such 
as: chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food processing, labeling and motor vehicles. Health and 
safety requirements are especially important in these sectors. In other sectors the OA is 
replaced by the New Approach directives.  
Since mid-eighties of XX century the EU is shifting slowly towards the so-called New 
Approach (NA) to harmonization, which was initiated by the Council of Resolution in 1985. 
                                               
5 European Commission (1998), p. 17. 
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It bases on setting only essential requirements for the most important characteristics of the 
products. NA directives apply to groups of products with similar characteristics, when 
national legislations differ. 
New Approach (comparing to OA) makes it easier for the producers to declare conformity 
with the EU technical regulations. Therefore it improves the efficiency of the European 
standardization bodies. For practical purposes, NA requires the appointment of Notified 
Bodies for testing and certification. The role of these bodies is defined by each NA directive. 
This leads to greater cooperation between the testing and certifying bodies established in each 
country. The visible effect of the New Approach is the CE-marking of products. Every 
product that meets all relevant requirements and conforms all relevant directives is affixed the 
CE-mark by either manufacturer or importer established in the European Union.  
New Approach seems to be quite effective in removing technical barriers to intra-EU trade. 
In 2003 more than 50% of intra-EU trade is covered by harmonized regulations and over 30% 
is covered by some kind of mutual recognition. Only 13% of intra-EU trade is not covered by 
any type of technical regulation. We will focus on the importance of different approaches for 
the EU trade with new members states.  
 
Effects of standardization on intra and extra EU trade 
In order to later assess the importance of the technical barriers to trade and the EU policy 
towards external world we look at the significance of the TBT’s in the EU. This is currently 
being analyzed by Hagemejer (2005). 
 The study uses a commonly employed CES preference structure as a basis for the theoretical 
model. Small country assumption allows for consumer price taking behaviour and estimation 
of the demand for imports equation alone.  
The demand for imports  of a variety i subject to TBT from the EU relative to the imports 
from the rest of the world and to the varieties not subject to TBT (double difference) is given 
by the following expression: 
 0 1 i 2 3 4log( ) TBT log( ) log( ) log( )i i i iY p t N           
Where y, p, t, and N are relative, eg: 
( ) ( )EU RoWTBT TBT
i EU RoW
nTBT nTBT
p i p i
p
p p



. TBT is a set of dummy variables 
corresponding to existence of one or more EU approaches in every i category. The variables 
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indexed by i and marked by TBT correspond to those CN-8 categories where there is one (or 
more) of the EU approaches present. For each EU country a ratio is used between the variable 
corresponding to imports from EU subject to an EU approach (EU,TBT) and the same variable 
corresponding to rest of the World (RoW, TBT). This is then normalized by a ratio of the same 
variable corresponding to the aggregate imports of products not covered by any approaches 
(EU, nTBT and RoW, nTBT). 
The estimations are based on trade data extracted from the Eurostat Comext database. 
containing intra and extra EU trade. The data on technical barriers to trade is taken from 
European Commission (1997). The publication reports what approach to reducing technical 
barriers to trade the European Single Market program has been selected for each industry. 
This is reported at the 3-digit NACE level. The concordance between CN and NACE 1970 
table is available and updated to correspond to years 1995 and 1999 that are used for 
estimation. For each NACE industry we can construct dummy variables reflecting presence of 
one or more EU approaches: harmonization, "new approach", mutual recognition. The 
estimations were performed at the level of CN 8 nomenclature. The price (unit value) data is 
derived from the Comext database. This is extracted for each of the EU countries and with 
recognition of the intra and extra EU trade. This gives a proxy for average price per 
product/source. The tariff data is extracted at the HS 6-digit level from the trains database. 
These MFN tariffs are averaged across import sources for the extra EU trade (intra-EU trade 
is tariff-free) using a simple mean. For each of the CN8 category, the corresponding tariff is 
the relevant HS6 category (CN6 and HS6 are equivalent). The variable measuring remaining 
(country AND product specific) trade barriers is omitted. 
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation. Variable pratio corresponds to the ratio of 
prices, variable nratio to the ratio of the number of varieties and variable tratio to 
relative tariffs. Variables OA, NA, MR correspond to dummy variables that are on when 
harmonization, new approach or mutual recognition are present (there are a number of 
categories where more than one approach is present).  
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Table 1 Estimation results 
year 1995 1999 
variable Coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
pratio -1.09294 -159.17 -1.0926 -132.76 
tratio 0.198738 18.55 0.022359 2.12 
nratio 1.432676 147.36 1.326079 115.4 
OA 0.054694 2.78 0.157403 5.44 
NA 0.18727 11.33 0.137403 4.83 
MR -0.0763 -4.94 -0.14174 -5.72 
constant 1.448324 108.77 1.278861 44.18 
Number of obs  86633  60112 
F-statistic  9322.86  6360.85 
Prob   F  0  0 
R-squared  0.3924  0.3884 
Adj R-squared  0.3923  0.3883 
Root MSE  2.0578  2.0149 
 
From table 1 we can see that all coefficients in all years are significant. pratio, 
tratio and nratio have also expected signs - negative on the price coefficient and 
positive on both the extra-EU tariff ratio and on the ratio of prices. When looking at the 
estimate of the 1  we can extract the estimate of the elasticity of substitution 11   . In 
both cases, 1995 and 1999, the elasticity of substitution is of the order of 2.09 which is within 
the lower range suggested by the literature.  
The estimates of tratio vary a lot between 1995 and 1999 with the latter being almost 
10 times smaller. Testing the hypothesis implied by the theoretical model that 2 11    is 
heavily rejected in both periods. This may be due either to low quality of tariff and price data 
and also to the aggregation procedure involving taking means over multiple partners.  
Turning to the estimates of coefficients on the variables of main interest OA, NA and 
MR we see significant differences between the estimates in the two periods. In 1995 the 
estimate for NA was the highest among all three, and the ratio of import volumes was on 
higher than the average by around 12.5 percent (ratio of the coefficient and the intercept). The 
same ratio for the products covered by harmonization was only higher by 3.75 percent 
(holding everything else constant). For products covered by mutual recognition, the ratio was 
lower than the average holding everything else constant, by about 4.8 percent. The 
coefficients are significantly different from each other.  
 8
In 1999 however, the estimates on the TBT variables are somewhat different. The 
highest is the coefficient on the harmonization (OA) dummy. In 1999 the import ratio for 
products covered by this approach was 12.3 percent higher than the average, holding 
everything else constant. For the second highest coefficient, on the new approach, the distance 
from the mean is equal to 10.7 percent. However, these two coefficients are not very different 
from each other. They are significantly different from the coefficient corresponding to the  
MR, which is again negative, and the ratio of imports for product covered by this approach is 
over 11 percent lower than average.  
The above results are somewhat striking. The common sense suggests that the mutual 
recognition approach is the most effective in eliminating technical barriers to trade. We have 
also noted that the OA is the most costly for the firms and that there might be problems with 
reaching agreement between EU members. The results contradict this hypothesis. There 
seems however, to be the plausible explanation for what the results suggest.  
We have to take into account how in fact import ratio is constructed. In the 
denominator we have everything that corresponds to the extra-EU trade, including the trade 
barriers. The possible explanation to the results is that the trade barriers within the EU are not 
very significant due to the standardization policy being in place. However, this policy affects 
a lot the external EU trade. We may expect that the MR approach is introduced in sectors 
when the amount of required product characteristics is low and in fact this sectors have low 
TBTs. The EU-mutual recognition do not impede the extra-EU imports since TBTs are low 
anyway. That is why we observe low internal/external import ratio for this sectors.  
The new and old approaches have a different effect. They do facilitate trade between 
the EU members but they impede the external trade. We can expect, than in these sectors - 
which are chemicals, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles etc., the TBTs are really high and 
common EU standardization policy is actually promoting internal trade.  The external partners 
have to meet both their home and the EU requirements which seems to impede trade a lot. 
The above hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the changes in the TBT’s significance over 
time. The results suggest that the EU members were still struggling with establishing 
agreements in the harmonization policy in 1995, while the adjustment process of both the 
national regulations and the firms have been more or less completed by 1999. That is why we 
see the increase in the coefficient on OA. The high coefficient on NA approach is as expected 
- this approach clearly facilitate trade since only the essential requirements need to be met.  
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The results suggest that there is a huge protective effect of both the OA and the NA 
approach. In fact, we can calculate the required decrease in the price ratio that would be 
equivalent to setting the ratio of imports to the same value as obtained by setting OA dummy 
to 1. This requires a decrease in the price ratio by 15 percent of a good for which the price 
ratio was initially equal to one. This corresponds to the idea of the trade diversion and high 
welfare effects of the standardization union. The country/region that is left out certainly 
looses, the countries within the union gain, provided that the difference in the costs of 
production between the union and the non-union trade partners are not too large.  
We can also see the TBT induced change in the structure of trade. The trade between EU 
members seems to be concentrated within the high-TBT products while the imports from 
outside are only focused on the low-TBT or no-TBT products. This certainly has implications 
for the world welfare since EU is one of the largest trade players and specialization facilitates 
exploitation in economies of scale and greater competitiveness in the world market. The 
possible implications for CEEC exports are presented  later on.  
 
Trade coverage of CEECs by different approaches to standardization 
The paper of Brenton, Sheehy and Vancauteren (2001) evaluates the importance of technical 
barriers to trade for 10 Central and Eastern European Countries. The authors estimated the 
share of the tradable goods that were affected by the various EU approaches to TBT removal. 
They analyzed 114 industrial sectors for the intensity of three EU approaches. According to 
the study the Old Approach was dominating in 22 sectors. The same number of sectors was 
affected by MRP regulation. The New Approach applied to 19 sectors. In the remaining 51 
sectors the standards were rare or nonexistent. The authors estimated the importance of 
standards in the intra-EU in the EU trade with acceding countries. Trade coverage of an 
approach is defined as the share of value of EU imports from a region subject to a particular 
standardization approach in the total value of EU imports from that region.  
The structure of CEEC’s exports evolved since the early 1990s as the countries began 
reorientation of their economies towards integration with the EU. This change led also to the 
evolution of trade coverage of different approaches. Trade coverage of various approaches in 
export of selected CEECs to the EU in the most recent years is presented in Table 2.  
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Table  2. Evolution of trade coverage of Old Approach, New Approach and Mutual Recognition 
in CEEC export to the EU – 1999-
2003.
Year Approach
Czech 
Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia INTRA-EUR
1999 OA 21,0% 30,3% 19,8% 33,4% 27,8%
2000 OA 24,7% 28,2% 27,6% 31,4% 27,7%
2001 OA 23,2% 29,9% 28,7% 31,0% 27,7%
2002 OA 22,2% 28,6% 28,4% 37,5% 28,2%
2003 OA 21,0% 27,9% 30,2% 39,4% 29,1%
1999 MR 18,9% 27,3% 29,9% 24,9% 25,8%
2000 MR 18,3% 26,3% 26,7% 23,3% 27,6%
2001 MR 19,9% 22,1% 26,0% 21,3% 28,0%
2002 MR 21,9% 22,6% 25,8% 19,0% 27,9%
2003 MR 21,7% 20,3% 23,4% 16,0% 27,9%
1999 NA 37,0% 17,0% 26,3% 22,0% 20,7%
2000 NA 35,1% 17,6% 24,7% 24,3% 19,8%
2001 NA 35,0% 17,7% 24,5% 24,5% 19,6%
2002 NA 34,3% 19,1% 25,3% 21,3% 19,3%
2003 NA 34,8% 19,6% 25,7% 19,3% 19,1%
1999 No regulation 17,2% 10,8% 13,9% 12,7% 13,5%
2000 No regulation 15,3% 10,2% 11,7% 12,5% 12,5%
2001 No regulation 14,5% 10,4% 11,6% 13,5% 12,8%
2002 No regulation 13,9% 11,0% 11,6% 12,5% 12,8%
2003 No regulation 13,9% 10,5% 12,1% 17,1% 13,0%  
Source: Own calculations using the data from European Commission (1998) and COMEXT 2004. 
The trade coverage of different approaches varies considerably across the CEEC. For 
instance, high share of Slovakian and Polish exports to the EU is covered by the Old 
Approach. For Poland, the share of exports covered by OA is actually very close to the value 
calculated for intra-EU6 trade. Old Approach seems least important for the Baltic States – it 
covers only 15-16% of the Estonian and Latvian exports to the EU. Baltic States, which are 
not shown here, benefit considerably from MR Principle. 47.5% of the Lithuanian export to 
the EU is covered either by MR Principle (42.1%) or by Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(remaining 5.4%). The numbers for Estonia and Latvia are not that impressive but are still 
high. The dominates in the exports of Czech Republic to the EU. As much as 35% of the 
value of their export are products covered by the New Approach.  
The structure of trade (from the point of view of trade coverage) has been evolving since 
the early 1990s when Central and Eastern European Countries began to integrate with the 
European Communities. It is especially visible for Poland, for which over half of its exports to 
                                               
6 By intra-EU we mean the trade between the countries that were Member States of the EU before 1 May 2004. 
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the EU in the late 1980s were not covered by any of the approaches. Now the pattern is very 
similar to the of intra-EU trade.  
All these countries have relatively smaller share of products exported to the EU covered by 
MRP. But in general the TBT trade coverage is getting much more similar over the time. Only 
in case of Baltic States the structure is somewhat different, in the sense that a high share of 
their exports is not covered by any type of regulation.  
We can therefore make a following observation. The intra industry pattern of CEEC exports 
to the old members of the EU revel large factor intensity differences demonstrated in many 
studies.7 In general, CEEC’s export unskilled labor intensive products and do import goods 
intensive in human capital and (to a smaller extent) in physical capital. On the other hand the 
differences in TBT coverage are very small, especially, if we compare them with exports of 
non-EU third countries.8  Thus, probably, the requirement to accept EU standards by 
prospective members from CEEC states gradually eliminated technical barriers facing their 
exports to the single European market.  
The following section verifies if companies in new member states confirm this opinion, which 
seems to be correct in view of presented earlier econometric results.  
Survey based analysis of TBTs faced by Polish companies. 
It is frequently argued that only the firms, that are active in international markets, can 
properly assess the importance of TBTs. Therefore, using thorough surveys can reveal links 
that could otherwise remain hidden. They can also serve as a basis for further research. We 
conducted this sort of review among Polish firms, just after the accession to the EU, in 
December 2004.  
There were two similar opinion surveys made before accession of Poland to the EU. 
They considered various obstacles regarding technical regulations in exports to the EU faced 
by Polish companies. Firstly, Gorzelak and Żołkiewski (2002) reported opinion of 96 firms, 
mainly big companies from food and chemical sector. According to their results, over one 
third of the sample expressed some difficulties in selling due to specific technical regulations. 
However, the overall cost-benefits balances were assessed as neutral by 90% of the 
respondents.  
                                               
7 Michalek, Sledziewska (2003).  
8 FEMISE report (2005). Chapter six. 
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Second survey by UKIE (2003), published in Marczewski (2003), included 272 Polish 
firms mainly from machinery, furniture and textile industries, where 70% of them were 
exporters to the EU. In this opinion poll most of the companies expressed their balanced 
interest in the technical regulations. Only smaller exporters assessed unification of standards 
as very beneficial. On the other hand these firms were the least prepared to meet the new EU 
regulations, including compulsory directives.  
In case of Poland, the questionnaire was made six months after accession to the 
European Union. The following industries were analyzed: food processing (NACE 15), 
chemical (NACE 24) and electrical (NACE 31). The main reason behind this choice was the 
extent of various EU regulations and standards effective in those industries. These industries 
also constitute relatively large shares of total Polish production (33%) as well as exports 
(19%). Two methods of data collection were used: personal interviews with 96 firms and 
email questionnaires, to which 55 firms responded. Altogether, 155 Polish companies 
answered provided us with their opinion; among them 54 firms belonged to food, 46 to 
chemical and 55 to electrical industry. 
We notice a number of positive effects that arose after joining the EU. The most 
important were the following: 
 More than 80% of the firms did not face any difficulties while selling their products in the 
EU and 75% of the firms did not have to redesign their products, i.e. they did not have to 
bear additional adjustment costs since the enlargement; 
 Most firms (usually in the food and electrical industries) assessed the existence of the MR 
principle positively due to their economic activity;  
 The firms are usually interested in ISO-9000 system, improving quality management in a 
company. 
 More than half of the exporters reported that the unification of technical standards within 
the European Union may positively affect their exports; 
 The general opinion on Poland’s membership in the EU is rather positive, given both the 
necessity of adjustment costs and the opportunities to sell in the common market. 
However, 19% of the firms said the membership would be negative for their economic 
activity. 
Apart from the positive effects of the membership we should notice that firms have to bear 
additional costs of adjustment to the new requirements. The assessment of these costs depends 
on a firm and on an industry: 
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 Quite significant percentage of firms said that Poland’s membership in the EU did not 
have any influence on their economic situation. Above 10% said that the harmonization of 
technical standards within the EU had negative impact on their activity; 
 A large number of firms in the food industry (54%) said that the cost of certification of 
their products had increased. Less than half of the surveyed firms answered that the cost 
of providing detailed information on their products’ labels was high. Again, these firms 
were usually from the food industry (43%), whereas in the chemical and electrical 
industries the most frequent answer was ‘neutral/negligible’; 
 More than half of the firms were not interested in the ISO-18000 and ISO-14000 systems. 
Only firms from the chemical industry applied ISO-14000 system. 
Results of the survey suggest that the effects of joining the EU were quite different for firms 
from different industries. Probably the highest cost was in the food industry. Here,  54% of 
the firms said that the net effect of joining the EU was positive, while still 20% said that the 
effect was negative. More than 30 percent of the food- industry firms had to invest to redesign 
their products to fulfill EU requirements what required major investments. 
The costs seem to be less pronounced in the chemical industry: 76% of the firms have not 
faced any difficulties while selling in the EU since 1st of May 2004. More than 70% said they 
were not forced to redesign their product to fulfill the EU requirements. An important issue is 
the opinion of firms about regulations on hazardous products, on soaps and fertilizers and on 
the so-called Good Laboratory Practice. 70% of the firms think that all these regulations have 
already been implemented or will be implemented soon; 
Firms from the electrical industry seemed to be well prepared for the membership in the EU 
and there has been little change in the industry since 1st of May 2004. Only 25% of the firms 
redesigned their product, what required minor investments. 60% of the firms admitted that 
unification of technical standards within the EU would be beneficial for their activity; 
The first general conclusion we may withdraw from the opinion of Polish companies facing 
various technical regulations within the EU common market is that they had to bear some 
adjustment costs. However the net effect of accession to EU is positive. Most of companies – 
especially exporters – said they expected benefits from harmonization of the standards and/or 
existence of the MR agreement. Secondly, it seems that the process of adjustment the EU 
regulations had already started and often was accomplished before 1 May 2004. It reduced the 
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additional adjustment costs after accession and enabled the firms to perceive net benefits 
arising from access to the common European market. 
 
Possible welfare gains resulting from Poland’s accession to the EU 
In this part of the project we try to asses the potential effects of implementing the EU 
standardization policy by new EU members. In the analysis we will use a computable general 
equilibrium model GTAP. It is a multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium model that is 
often employed in the evaluation of trade policies. The model and the corresponding GTAP 
database used here is prepared by the Global Trade Analysis Project at Purdue University, 
USA.  
The general structure of the model is relatively simple9. It assumes the existence of the 
regional household that takes all the expenditure decisions within the economy. This entity is 
allocating expenditures to private consumption, government expenditures or savings. In the 
multi-region model each of these shares of expenditures is further divided into domestically 
produced goods and imports. 
The firms produce using the primary factors purchased from the regional household and 
intermediates. The sources of primary factors are purely domestic – it is assumed that the 
factors are strictly immobile internationally and mobile within a region (with exception of 
land and natural resources). The intermediate goods can be either domestically produced and 
imported. 
The demand side of the GTAP model is modeled through the regional household concept. The 
structure of preference of the regional household is based on the multiply nested utility 
function. According to such a function, the division of expenditure is made at different level 
of aggregation. In the case of the GTAP model, on the top level or the top nest the household 
is taking a decision concerning allocation of expenditures between the private consumption, 
government consumption and savings. The allocation is done according to the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function. The government consumption and private consumption expenditures are 
further allocated into domestic and imported goods according to the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. The imported goods are differentiated according to the 
Armington aggregation, using another CES function. 
                                               
9This part follows Hertel, Tsigas (1997), Structure of GTAP 
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On the supply side, the production function has a similar structure as the utility function. It is 
also a multi-level concept. The demands derived from the production function allocate 
expenditures into primary factors (eg. land, capital, labour, natural resoutces) and 
intermediates. The demand for these two broadly defined aggregates is Leontief.  
The research cited before, both on the problem of the creation of the single market and on the 
EU enlargement assumes that the standardization policy of the European Union leads to the 
partial or complete removal of the non-tariff barriers, especially the technical barriers to trade 
that arise due to different and incompatible policies on norm and standards of countries being 
trade partners. This assumptions seems plausible, taking into account that the one of the main 
objective of the of the European Union single market-related policies is dismantling the 
technical barriers to trade.  
In papers by Maliszewska (2002) and Hofmann (2001) it is assumed that the lack of the 
common standardization policy of the countries participating in international trade leads to a 
inefficiency that leads to the increase in price of a product imported. In Hofmann’s work it is 
assumed that the inefficiency is leading to an increase in prices equal to 2.5 percent of the 
value of imports. Maliszewska differentiates these costs according to sector. In her research 
she assumes that the removal of the inefficiency leads to a reduction of transport costs. 
 In the GTAP model, transport costs are modeled by a global transport sector producing a 
transport service which is purchased in the process of imports of good. In the way the GTAP 
model works, reduction of the cost of transport leads to a decrease of its price. This in turns 
leads to an increased demand for transport services. In a general equilibrium framework it 
leads to an increase in supply and requires extra resources shifted into transport sector from 
other sector. A decrease in transport cost thus leads here to a decrease of production by all 
sectors except the transport sector. Thus, in the GTAP framework, modeling of price wedges 
through transport costs is not a correct solution. 
 Keeping the above in mind, we take another approach to the problem which is easily 
implemented using the simple structure of the GTAP model. The parameter ams, indexed by 
product, origin country, destination country, import-augmenting "technical change" variable 
can be used. “Shocks to ams(i,r,s) represent the negative of the rate of decay on imports of 
commodity or service i from region r imported by region s. When ams(i,r,s) is shocked by 
20%, then 20% more of the product becomes available to domestic consumers - given the 
same level of exports from the source country. In order to ensure that producers still receive 
the same revenue on their sales, effective import prices (pms) fall by 20%” (Hertel, 
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McDougall, Itakura, 2001). In fact, the parameter corresponds to the iceberg transport cost 
and causes the effective price faced by the importer to go down.  
For the purpose of the simulation, the following aggregated database has been created. The 
following Central and Eastern European countries have been disaggregated: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The EU has been disaggregated 
into two regions: Germany (being a largest trade partner of many of the CEEC’s) and the Rest 
of the UE. The remaining regions were aggregated into Rest of the World. 
In the simulation, it was assumed that due to the decrease in the TBT’s in the European Union 
(similarly as in Hoffmann), the prices of imports go down by maximally 2.5 percent. It is 
reflected by shocking the ams variable to 2.5 percent. This price change is also differentiated 
by sector (following Hoffmann (2001) and cited by Maliszewska (2002)). The exact change 
of ams is given below: 
Table 3 Shock to price of imports 
Sector 
Change in 
price 
Agriculture 2.5 
Raw materials 2.5 
Food 2.5 
Textiles 2.5 
Apparel 2.5 
Leather products 2.5 
Wood products 0.875 
Paper and printing 1.875 
Fuels 2.5 
Chemicals 1 
Minerals 0.625 
Ferrous metals 0.875 
Other materials 1.125 
Metal products 1.125 
Vehicles 0.5 
Other transport equipment 1.375 
Electronics 0.625 
Other industrial production 0.625 
Other machinery 0.625 
The decrease of the price of imports is bilateral and focused on the new EU members and the 
EU-15. The price of a given product from a CEEC goes down in every EU country (both EU-
15 and accessing) and the same applies to EU-15 products purchased in the CEEC markets. 
We evaluate two scenarios a short term and a long term (with capital accumulation). The 
immediate effect in short run of the decrease of the price of imports is the increase of the 
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volume of international trade. The table below shows the German import changes from the 
Central and Eastern European countries under consideration. 
Table 4 Export changes to Germany 
Industry 
R
est of U
E
 
C
zech 
R
epublic 
E
stonia 
Poland 
H
ungary 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
L
ithuania 
L
atria 
R
est 
of 
the 
W
orld 
Agriculture -0.3 7.6 9.0 8.9 6.8 8.4 10.0 9.1 8.2 -0.1 
Raw materials -0.4 15.3 13.2 17.2 20.6 20.4 23.4 12.4 19.9 -0.3 
Food -0.2 4.8 7.1 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.8 4.6 4.0 -0.1 
Textiles -1.3 14.0 17.2 14.5 12.9 14.6 14.0 16.2 15.5 -1.3 
Apparel -1.8 12.0 13.6 12.0 9.4 11.5 13.9 14.8 13.2 -1.8 
Leather products -1.4 13.8 14.0 13.3 13.0 13.2 13.2 14.2 13.2 -1.3 
Wood products -0.3 -0.5 2.9 0.4 3.4 -0.7 1.8 -0.9 -1.6 -0.2 
Paper and printing -0.4 5.3 6.4 6.5 7.5 4.9 5.6 5.9 5.0 -0.3 
Fuels -0.2 7.7 3.4 7.2 7.7 7.9 7.9 4.9 6.9 -0.3 
Chemicals -0.1 3.7 2.7 2.9 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.0 0.0 
Minerals 0.1 -1.4 1.1 0.2 -1.5 -0.7 -0.4 -1.3 -1.6 0.2 
Ferrous metals -0.2 1.8 -0.3 0.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 1.3 0.2 -0.1 
Other materials -0.3 2.5 1.0 2.7 5.0 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.2 -0.2 
Metal products -0.5 1.7 3.6 2.7 1.5 1.2 3.1 2.3 0.7 -0.3 
Vehicles -0.2 1.0 -0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.1 
Other transport 
equipment 
-0.4 8.7 7.3 6.9 6.7 5.5 6.3 3.0 2.3 -0.3 
Electronics -0.1 0.7 0.2 0.8 3.5 -1.6 1.1 0.1 -1.3 0.0 
Other industrial 
production 
-0.2 2.8 -2.4 -0.1 0.6 0.0 2.0 -1.0 -2.2 -0.1 
Other machinery 0.0 -0.6 2.7 0.9 -0.8 -0.8 0.1 -0.4 -1.4 0.1 
 
Clearly the most significant export changes in all countries under consideration are 
concentrated in sectors producing raw materials, textiles, apparel, leather products. The 
changes in exports to Germany in the case of imports amount to 20 percent and are the highest 
in Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary. In Poland, the simulated increase in exports to Germany 
amounts to 17 percent. In the case of textiles, apparel or leather products, the simulated 
changes range close to 15 percent. There are significant changes in exports of agricultural 
products, however, we have to keep in mind that this simulation does not take into account 
changes in agricultural tariffs and subsidies due to EU enlargement and we should probably 
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expect much larger changes if those are included (as 2003 increase of Polish exports have 
shown), paper and printing industry and transport equipment. Changes in those sectors range 
between 5 to 10 percent depending on a region. In the remaining sectors, for most of the new 
member states of the EU, the change in exports is less than 5 percent. As a result of the 
demand shift towards new member states, import of Germany from remaining EU member 
falls down by a small amount. The largest change is found in the case of apparel. 
The similar changes can be expected exports to the EU-14 countries, which are not cited here.  
The growth in imports has a similar structure as in the case of exports to Germany. The 
largest increase in exports (above 5 percent) is expected in agriculture, food, paper, fuels and 
the transport equipment. In Poland, the largest simulated increase is expected in the textile 
industry. 
Changes in export to the EU cause a large change in the total exports of the EU-acceding 
CEEC’s. The largest changes in exports are expected for Poland where the change is 
estimated at 1.6 percent. In Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, this value 
amounts to around 1.4 percent change. In the remaining countries the change is close to one 
percent. The results are given in the table below. 
Table 5 Change in total export value 
Country % change in export value 
Czech Republic 1.407 
Estonia 1.347 
Poland 1.616 
Hungary 0.882 
Slovakia 1.4 
Slovenia 0.993 
Latvia 0.919 
Lithuania 1.434 
 
The output changes resulting from policy experiment are concentrated in the industries where 
the largest increase in export was simulated. The largest increase in production is expected in 
textiles and apparel industry. In the case of textiles the largest increase is simulated for 
Estonia,  Lithuania and Latvia and for apparel for Estonia and Lithuania. This changes range 
from 5 to 12 percent. Other industries where there are expected significant changes in 
production are raw materials (especially Lithuania and Estonia), fuels, other materials and 
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transport equipment. There are industries where output is expected to drop – chemicals, 
minerals, ferrous metals, metal products and electronics. The changes are usually less than 
two percent of the value of production. The detailed simulation results are given below. 
The changes in export lead to, through changes in production, change in the gross domestic 
product. Not only the export grows but also we impose a policy experiment where the import 
demand grows as well. The change in GDP is a sum of these two changes. The simulated 
change of GDP of the countries under consideration is given below. 
Table 6 GDP changes resulting from TBT elimination 
Country 
Change in 
GDP 
Germany 0.037 
Rest of EU 0.006 
Czech Republic 1.512 
Estonia 1.599 
Poland 1.015 
Hungary 1.544 
Slovakia 1.565 
Slovenia 1.456 
Latvia 1.66 
Lithuania 1.774 
Rest of the World -0.023 
According to the simulation results, the largest increase of GDP as a result of a decrease of 
the technical barriers to trade will be experienced by Lithuania and Latvia, where the increase 
amounts to 1.77 and 1.66 percent respectively. For Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovaka and 
Slovenia the simulated GDP increases are equal to 1.4 to 1.6 percent. For Poland the 
simulated change is equal to 1 percent. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper argues that in sectors where the EU technical regulations are most complicated and 
require costly adaptation, the trade within EU is booming. We argue that the trade between 
EU members is more concentrated within the high-TBT products, while the imports from 
outside are focused on the low-TBT or no-TBT products. Thus, EU technical regulations 
might in fact be trade diverting if the difference in productivity between intra and extra-EU 
partners is large. 
We demonstrate that the structure of TBT’s affecting exports from new EU members is 
converging with the one that characterizes intra-EU trade. Therefore, we expect that CEEC’s 
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countries will benefit from applying common technical regulations of the EU after accession, 
provided that the initial adjustment costs are not excessively high.  
In the last section of our paper we report the results of questionnaire-based research made 
among Polish companies in December of 2005, i.e. after the Eastern enlargement. It seems 
that the adjustment costs were moderate and the adaptation process to new technical 
regulations is already completed. Therefore, one can expected welfare gains for new members 
of the EU. We perform a CGE simulation using a GTAP model to assess these gains. Both the 
econometric analysis and the GTAP simulation imply that the effects of changes in 
standardization policy and especially creation of standardization unions have important 
welfare effects. For Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovaka and Slovenia the simulated GDP 
increases are equal to 1.4 to 1.6 percent, whereas for Poland the simulated change is equal to 
1 percent. 
 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Armington P. (1969) A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of production, IMF Staff 
papers XVI, p. 156-176. 
Brenton, P., Sheehy, J. and Vancauteren, M., (2001) Technical Barriers to Trade in the European 
Union: Importance for Accession Countries, Journal of Common Market Studies 39, 2: 265-
284. 
European Commission (1998): The Single Market Review, Dismantling of Barriers. Technical 
Barriers to Trade. Sub-series III: Volume 1, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. Luxembourg.  
FEMISE, FEM 22-03 (2005), Comparative analysis of importance of technical barriers o 
trade for CEECs and MPC exports to the EU. The report was prepared by J. Michalek, 
J. Hagemejer and J. Rothert from Warsaw University and by Alfred Tovias and 
Victoia Roshal from Hebrew University. Additional contributions were made by Mark 
Vancauteren and Agnieszka Pugacewicz.  
Gandal, N., Shy, O., 2001, Standardization policy and international trade, Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 53, p. 363-383. 
Gorzelak M., Żołkiewski Z. (2002) The perception of technical barriers to trade of manufacturing 
enterprises in Poland, w: Brenton, P., Manzocchi, S. (eds.) (2002), Enlargement, Trade and 
Investment. The Impact of Barriers to Trade in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Hagemejer J. (2005), Significance of the EU standardization policy for  
intra and extra-EU trade, Unpublished Manuscript  
Hagemejer J., Michałek J. (2004) The Significance of Technical Barriers  to Trade for Poland and 
other CEEC’s Acceding to the EU: Reconsidering the Evidence in: EMERGO: Journal of 
transforming economies and societies, pp. 36-52, vol. XI, no. 1(39). 
Hertel T., Tsigas M., (1997) Structure of GTAP, GTAP Resource #413,  
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=413 
Hertel T., McDougall R., Itakura K. (2001) GTAP Model Version 6.0, GTAP Resource #576, 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=576 
 21
Hoffmann A.N., (2000) The Gains from Partial Completion of the Single Market, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 2000 no.4 
 
Maliszewska M. (2002), Eastern EU Expansion: Implications Of The Enlarged Single Market For 
Current And New Member States, Paper presented at ETSG Annual Conference 
Marczewski K. (2003), Kierunki zmian w handlu zagranicznym Polski po przystąpieniu do Unii 
Europejskiej, (Possible changes in the Polish trade after accession to the EU) Ekonomista no. 
2/2003, pp. 191-216. 
Michalek J., Sledziewska, K. (2004), Inter-industry trade between Central-East European 
countries and the EU. Do changes in the trade pattern reflect H-O approach?, paper 
presented at the Annual ETSG conference in Madrid (September 2004). 
Moenius, J. (1999), "Information versus Product Adaptation: The role of Standards in Trade", working 
paper no. 11/2499, University of California, San Diego. 
 
 
